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Strategy

  • Ten games to find a shape

    Fulham v Newcastle Match Report

    Jacob Murphy scored with a shot that had a two per cent chance of going in. Rodrigo Muniz equalised three minutes later. Between the two goals sat a Newcastle side that had settled, at last, on a way of defending in this league.

    Eighty minutes into a 9°C Saturday afternoon at Craven Cottage, César Palacios, a Fulham substitute from Spain, plays a pass across his own half that nobody is waiting for. Jacob Murphy is. He runs at the defence, cuts inside Calvin Bassey and hits a left-footed shot from 25 yards into the top corner.

    It had a two per cent chance of going in.

    Three minutes later Palacios crosses from the left. The ball strikes Malick Thiaw and runs loose, and Rodrigo Muniz, a Brazilian striker on as a substitute, gets a boot to it. It finishes 1-1.

    Newcastle should have won, and the goalkeeper is the best evidence. Lukáš Horníček, the Czech who joined from Braga in August, pushed away Oscar Bobb’s shot early in the first half. He got down to a first-time strike from Josh King, Fulham’s 19-year-old playmaker, who had just been given his first England call-up. He palmed away a near-post header from Timothy Castagne, the Fulham right-back. Three minutes into added time Lewis Miley headed away a free-kick and the ball dropped to Ryan Sessegnon, who hit it first time for the top corner. Horníček got a hand to it and pushed it past the post.

    Murphy was named player of the match. My vote goes to the goalkeeper.

    In front of him, Thiaw and the captain Dan Burn gave Fulham’s striker Gonzalo García one clear chance all afternoon, a header from a corner that went over the bar. Burn came close to giving Newcastle the lead before half-time. Lewis Hall played a short corner to Murphy, Murphy crossed, and Burn poked the ball in at the near post. The goal was ruled out because Yoane Wissa had pulled Castagne’s shirt. Jaissle called it soft.

    Nico González and Sean Steur, who is 18, sat in front of the back four and kept it shut. Their main job was Josh King, and he managed two shots and no chance for anyone else before Fulham took him off. Steur was the busier of the two. He made nine defensive contributions, more than any other Newcastle midfielder.

    The slot in front of them is a different matter. Wissa came off after an hour having made little of it. Matias Fernandez-Pardo, the 21-year-old Belgian who cost £51m from Lille on deadline day, arrived in the 74th minute and was pushed off the ball too easily. I would put a No 10 at the top of the January list.

    Ten games

    On 2 November, after Everton won 1-0 at St James’ Park, the home supporters booed Jaissle off. Five days later, at Craven Cottage, his team looked like something he could build on. I wanted to see whether the numbers said the same.

    August

    The first three league games brought five points. No Newcastle manager had taken four from his first two since Sam Allardyce in 2007-08.

    Against Liverpool on the opening day Newcastle led 2-1 until Dominik Szoboszlai scored a penalty deep into stoppage time. Liverpool had shot more than twice as often. Tottenham and Bournemouth each had 17 shots, and by the third game no side in the division had faced more. Sven Botman, who started the first seven league games, kept making mistakes that led to shots. He had five by early November, the most in the league.

    Newcastle in August went forward quickly and were exposed whenever the ball was lost.

    September and October

    The next experiment ran the other way. Newcastle kept the ball: more than half of it on average, and two-thirds at Coventry, where they had more than twice as many shots as the home side and lost 4-1. They had lost 4-1 at Leeds a month earlier. A team that gives the ball away high up the pitch is open when it does, and Leeds and Coventry punished it.

    Selhurst Park to Craven Cottage

    Then came Selhurst Park. Jaissle brought back Burn and Fabian Schär in central defence, put William Osula up front and let Palace have the ball. Newcastle won 2-0.

    Opponents now get about half the open-play chances against Newcastle that they got in August. Possession is back where it started, so the ball is not what changed. At Craven Cottage Newcastle gave up fewer chances than in any of the ten games and made more interceptions than in any other. By my count they defended in a 5-4-1, which I had not seen from Jaissle before.

    Averaging where each player touched the ball shows the team being squeezed together. In August the midfield sat close to the defence and a long way from the forwards, which is how a team that goes long looks on the map. In the middle weeks the midfield moved up to join the forwards and left the defence behind, and the widest gap of all opened at Coventry. Over the last three games the whole team has been about a third tighter than in August. The defenders play higher, the forwards a little deeper, and the midfield sits between them. Everton, a game Newcastle lost, was the tightest of the ten. Hull in September came close, but it did not last.

    These are touch locations and not tracking, and they cover the whole match, so a side chasing a game sits differently from one that is leading it.

    The attack changed shape too. At Everton, Newcastle shot from distance and seldom troubled the goalkeeper. Five days later at Fulham they had fewer shots, taken from closer in, and made three big chances. Barnes’s shots alone were worth 0.66 expected goals, and none went in.

    The cost is at set pieces. Palace and Everton got most of their chances from corners and free kicks, and Thierno Barry’s goal at St James’ Park came from one.

    The minutes

    The players who have played most tell the same story.

    Horníček has played every minute of the ten games, and his rating follows how much work he is given: high in August, low in the Leeds and Coventry weeks, high again lately. Hall has played nearly every minute and has hardly dropped below good.

    The centre of defence changed. Botman improved through the middle weeks and lost his place after the Villa defeat. Thiaw had a modest spell, sat out at Palace and Everton and was among the better players at Fulham beside Burn.

    González started slowly. By Coventry he was Newcastle’s best player, and again at Palace. He and Miley both improved sharply between the first four weeks and the next four. Steur has played less, but against Hull he was one of the best on the pitch.

    The front line has less to show. Barnes has played almost every minute and did his best work before Everton. Wissa scored at Tottenham in the second game, and his ratings since have stayed in the sixes. So have Pardo’s, in six appearances.

    The last graphic ranks everyone with 250 minutes or more. Murphy, Hall and Elanga head the table, although Murphy and Elanga have played less than half of Hall’s minutes. Hornícek and Barnes, who have played nearly every minute, sit fourth and fifth. Pardo is last.

    Arsenal

    Newcastle have taken four points from their last nine, and the balance of chances over the last three games is no better than over the four before. The set pieces leak. The attack has not arrived. Three games is a small sample.

    The international break comes first. Then Arsenal arrive at St James’ Park on Saturday 21 November for a 5.30pm Sky kick-off, as league leaders on 27 points after Martin Ødegaard’s winner against Hull. Fulham go to Manchester City the same day. Newcastle are 11th on 12 points, and the Tyne-Wear derby follows on 6 December.

    Arsenal will tell me more than Fulham did.

    Match statistics, ratings and touch locations are from FotMob, using Opta data. Performance grades are from Gradient Sports.

  • The Second Match

    Five defeats in seven, a restless St James’ Park and a timeline full of verdicts. On what the noise around Matthias Jaissle does to those of us listening.

    Five defeats in seven matches, thirteenth in the table, and a St James’ Park that vented its anger at half-time on Monday night and again at the final whistle. Everton had already won in the Carabao Cup, away from home. Now they had won again on Tyneside, in the league, and the frustration came down off the stands in waves.

    Then the match on the pitch ended and a second one began, the argument over what it all meant, fought out online.

    The second match is played on phones. Its pitch is a timeline, a Reddit thread, a WhatsApp group that has been silent since the weekend and suddenly lights up with twelve messages in a minute. It has no referee and no final whistle. After the Aston Villa defeat earlier this season, supporters of Al-Ahli, the Saudi club Jaissle managed before he came to Newcastle, had a hashtag demanding his sacking running within minutes. People with no season ticket and no stake in where Newcastle finish joined the chorus, and nobody scrolling past could tell which voices belonged to the Gallowgate and which belonged to somewhere else entirely.

    I have no verdict to add on Jaissle here. I’ll leave that argument to others for now. What interests me is what the volume does to the rest of us while we listen.

    The pull

    In 1951, Solomon Asch put a young man in a room at Swarthmore College with seven other people and a card showing a line. The task was to say which of three other lines matched it. The answer was obvious. The other seven, all of them actors, had been told to give the same wrong answer on twelve of the eighteen rounds.

    About a third of the answers on those critical rounds matched the planted majority. Three-quarters of the participants went along with the room at least once. In a control group with no actors, fewer than one per cent of people got it wrong.

    Asch also found the thread that unravels the whole thing. When a single actor broke ranks and gave the right answer, conformity dropped sharply. One dissenting voice made the other seven far easier to resist.

    Asch’s lines had a correct answer printed on the back of the card. Football offers nothing of the kind. Is Matias Fernandez-Pardo ready to start? Does a particular system suit this particular squad? Is a manager two months into the job showing flaws or still finding his feet? Those questions have no card with the answer on the back, which makes the room even more persuasive.

    I’ll put my hand up. When I see a wall of people asking for something, whether it’s a manager sacked or a £51m forward in the starting eleven, it builds a sense of expectation. Often I catch myself agreeing because I want to belong to the right group. If the masses say it, part of me wants to be among the masses. When the subject is something I care about this much, the pressure is intense.

    It works the same way with politics and religion. Football just happens to be a small, niche, constantly observable laboratory for it, and Newcastle, with its fifty-two thousand voices and its permanent state of heightened feeling, is a very good place to watch it happen.

    A price is not a fact

    Bankers know this pattern in another costume.

    In 1983, Douglas Diamond and Philip Dybvig published a model of a bank run. Their point was uncomfortable. A perfectly solvent bank can fail if enough depositors believe other depositors are about to withdraw. Each individual’s decision is rational given what they expect everyone else to do. Nobody needs to have read the balance sheet. The belief about other people’s belief does the damage.

    A campaign to sack a manager, Jaissle now or anyone else in future, has the same architecture. The more people who say it, the more it seems that others must have seen something, and the more reasonable it feels to say it too. A share price works this way as well. It records what the market is willing to pay today, and whether the company is worth that is a separate question that someone has to answer by doing the work.

    The temperature of a timeline is a price. It tells you what the crowd is willing to say right now, which is useful information about the crowd.

    Who is actually talking

    A Pew Research Center study of American adults on Twitter, published in 2019, found that the most active ten per cent of users produced about eighty per cent of the tweets. The median user posted twice a month. Nothing in that study was about football, the platform has changed since, and the data is American. It still describes how a timeline gets its shape: a small, prolific minority generating most of the words, and a much larger audience that reads and says nothing.

    From where I sit, loud and numerous look identical. A thousand angry posts in an hour feel like a thousand angry supporters. Some of them are one supporter posting eleven times.

    Framing adds another layer. Several outlets this week ran headlines built around the word “sack”. Read beneath them and the reports describe a club with no plans to move, a board said to be standing by its man. I can’t see inside the building and those are reports, not facts, but the gap between the headline and the copy tells you something about how a story gets its temperature. The word that goes into the headline is the word that goes into the group chat.

    The best outcome and the likeliest one

    Thinking independently takes deliberate effort. It needs quiet time, away from the notifications, to sit with an issue and let it settle. Then comes a second job that I find harder: separating what would be the best outcome from what is the most likely one. They are sometimes mutually exclusive.

    A change in the dugout might be the best thing for the club and also the least likely to happen. A change might be the likeliest outcome and also a poor idea. A signing might deserve a start on merit and still sit on the bench for reasons nobody outside the training ground can see. The crowd tends to fuse these questions into a single demand, because a demand is easier to type than a probability.

    Inside a bank’s credit committee, nobody asks which outcome the room would like. They ask which outcome the file supports, and how confident anyone should be. It feels cold at first. It is also the only way I know to keep wishing and forecasting apart.

    The phrasing matters

    This is one of the things I think hardest about when I write for this blog. “Under pressure” and “failing” are different sentences. “Calls for” and “demands” are different sentences. A choice of verb can carry a conclusion into a reader’s head before the evidence has arrived, and I would rather the reader reach their own conclusion on the way. If I do my job properly, you finish a post of mine knowing what happened, why it might have happened, and where I am uncertain, with room left to disagree with me.

    Newcastle travel to Craven Cottage on Saturday to face Fulham. Before a ball is kicked, someone in the group chat will already have decided what the result is going to mean, win or lose. I’d like to watch the match first and make up my own mind afterwards.

  • Give Jaissle Time

    Patience

    Newcastle have lost three of their first seven league games, and the boos have already started. Panic now would cost the club more than the defeats have.

    In the 36th minute against Aston Villa on 17 October, João Gomes, Villa’s Brazilian midfielder, finds space on the right and crosses. Johan Manzambi, the 20-year-old Swiss attacking midfielder Newcastle had agreed a £49m fee for in July before Villa went higher, heads it past Lukáš Horníček.

    Watch it back and every Newcastle player near the ball has a job. Harvey Barnes, on the left, keeps his eye on Matty Cash, Villa’s right-back, overlapping behind the play. Lewis Hall stays tight to a runner cutting inside. Closing down Gomes falls to the midfield, and Nico González gets there late. After 35 minutes of chasing the ball high up the pitch he looks like a man who has run out of air.

    It was not a one-off. In the third game of the season, Bournemouth had 13 first-half shots at St James’ Park and one match report spoke of a team running out of steam. Jaissle said much the same after beating Hull: the legs went late, with nine players missing. At Coventry, Newcastle had 67% of the ball and 19 shots to nine and conceded four. ‘We controlled many phases but it’s not enough,’ Jaissle told the BBC.

    The plan is clear. González, signed from Manchester City for a reported £50m, told NUFC TV that Jaissle ‘wants direct football, intense’, with the ball won back high the moment it is lost. The midfielders who could have run all day for that, Bruno Guimarães and Sandro Tonali, left in the summer. González is a passer, and a good one: on his debut at Tottenham he lifted a long ball inside the first minute that led to a clear chance. Analysts who charted the early games noted that he drops between his centre-backs in build-up, so he starts attacks from deep and is then expected to sprint out and shut down the winger when they break down. At Villa he was late doing the second job.


    That adds up to a job half done, and the people meant to finish it need the time to do it.

    I have watched this happen at work whenever a new boss arrives with a new strategy. The people were hired for the old plan, and the new plan doesn’t alter what they are good at. Nobody sensible expects them to change in a few weeks. González won’t become an elite presser in two months, and no amount of booing will speed it up. The sensible route is to build the game around what the squad does well today and plan the move towards Jaissle’s ideal over a longer period. Some players switch quickly. Joelinton arrived at Newcastle as a striker and became one of the best midfielders in the league. Most take far longer.

    Newcastle supporters need no lecture on this, because we lived it. Eddie Howe took over a club that was 19th in November 2021 and spent most of that season in the bottom three. We finished 11th, and the year after we were in the Champions League. The same story runs through the league. Pep Guardiola ended his first year at Manchester City third and without a trophy, then won the title with 100 points. Jürgen Klopp’s Liverpool finished eighth in his first season and were champions four years later. Clubs that waited were rewarded for it.

    Why should Newcastle give him this time? Start with what he did at Al-Ahli. He took over a side that had only just been promoted and came close to being sacked early in the 2024-25 season. The club’s board resisted a knee-jerk reaction and backed him to turn it around, and Al-Ahli’s fans reportedly protested when the club weighed replacing him with Massimiliano Allegri that January. He survived, finished that campaign as champion of Asia, and won it again the year after. Along the way he rebuilt his own football. At Salzburg he ran a young, pressing-first side. At Al-Ahli he had to fit Riyad Mahrez, Roberto Firmino, Ivan Toney and Franck Kessié into a 4-2-3-1, with more weight on defensive organisation and quick counter-attacks down the flanks. A data review of his Saudi years found that Al-Ahli became less possession-heavy and less busy without the ball, and defended better anyway, because the press became more efficient. He kept his principles and changed the workload. That is the skill Newcastle need from him now, and he has already shown it under heavier pressure than a poor October. After Coventry he said the formation was not the issue. If he is right, the thing that has to flex is what he asks of the players inside it.

    The second reason is what the failures look like. Legs fading late, one midfielder carrying two jobs and nobody named to pick up the crosser are coaching problems, and coaching problems get fixed on a training ground. They don’t suggest a dressing room that has stopped listening. Five days after the 4-1 defeat at Leeds, Newcastle beat Hull 2-1 with goals in the third and seventh minutes, with nine players missing. At Coventry they had most of the ball and 19 shots. That is a squad that wants to do what it is told and is finding the limits of what it can do, which gives a good coach something to work with.

    I’d start with the press. A side that cannot sustain it for 90 minutes can still press well for 20, with spells in a mid-block when the legs go and the whole team resetting its shape together. It costs a little ambition and it protects the legs of a midfield that has not yet been built for the full 90.

    Then I’d give the wide channel an owner. When the full-backs push up in build-up, someone has to be named to pick up the crosser if the ball is lost, and the rule has to be drilled until nobody needs to think about it.

    González’s own job comes next. He does one of his two tasks far better than the other, and it is the one Jaissle bought him for. A midfield partner who covers ground would let him remain a passer.

    The last adjustment is about listening. Ted Lasso is a fictional American football coach who is suddenly hired, in the television series of the same name, to manage a Premier League club. He was an outsider learning an unfamiliar league in a hurry, and the useful part of that story was how he asked the people who already knew the place. Jaissle’s dressing room has players who have spent years in this league, Joelinton and Dan Burn among them. They can tell him where the Premier League punishes a high line or a vacated channel, and a head coach who takes that advice early will adapt faster than one who has to learn it on Saturdays.

    Patience should still come with conditions. Here is what I would hold him to over the next few games. Does Newcastle’s press come in spells, with calmer periods in between? And is it clear who picks up the crosser when the full-backs are high? If both improve, Jaissle is adapting, even if the results take longer to follow. Crystal Palace away on Saturday 24 October, Everton at home a week later and Arsenal on 21 November give him three tests of it.

    So I’d ask supporters to hold their nerve. After two 4-1 defeats and a home loss, they booed the team in frustration, and nobody can say they had no reason. But the boos fix nothing. The squad is fixed until January, so the only thing that can improve over the next few weeks is how Jaissle and the players work together, and that needs training days and match minutes. Turning on the head coach now would restart the same learning with someone else, who would inherit the same midfield, the same legs and the same absences. Managers who have become great were each given time to reshape a squad, and none of them could have done it in a month.

    Newcastle sit eleventh on eight points. Back the team at Selhurst Park on Saturday, and judge Jaissle on whether it looks like a side that is learning.

  • Five years of patience: How Newcastle United turned a rescue into a project

    PIF 5th Anniversary

    On the day PIF bought the club, one of its new co-owners asked supporters to be patient. Five years later, patience looks less like a plea and more like a strategy.

    Newcastle lost 2–1 at Wolves on 2 October 2021. Five days later, nobody on Tyneside was talking about it.

    On 7 October, the Premier League confirmed that the club had been sold to a consortium led by Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund (PIF), the state’s sovereign wealth fund. Mike Ashley’s 14-year ownership was over. The reported price was about £305m, roughly twice what the club earned in a year.

    Supporters celebrated. A Newcastle United Supporters’ Trust survey days earlier had found 93.8% in favour.

    Hours after the deal, Amanda Staveley, then a co-owner, promised investment at every level. She also asked for patience.

    It was a strange request to make of a fanbase that had waited since 1955 for a domestic trophy. It turned out to be the whole story.

    A club left to rot

    Patience was needed because of what the new owners had bought.

    Ashley took over in 2007 and spent much of the next 14 years trying, on and off, to sell. Relegations came in 2009 and 2016. Turnover was £129.7m in 2014-15. By 2021 it had reached only about £140m.

    The training ground at Benton told the story in bricks. It opened in 2002, and Sir Bobby Robson described it with pride as state-of-the-art. Under Ashley it received little more than a coat of paint. After the takeover, the club’s own planning application admitted its facilities fell “significantly below the Premier League and perhaps even Championship standards”. Staveley later called the place a joke.

    St James’ Park carried Sports Direct advertising. The trophy drought ran back to 1955. The Champions League was a distant memory.

    So the mood on 7 October was less triumph than relief. For 14 years, supporters had wondered whether anyone at the top was trying. Now somebody was, and with resources no Newcastle owner had ever had.

    Hope arrived with a shopping list.

    Steve Bruce left on 20 October. Eddie Howe arrived on 8 November. In January 2022 came Bruno Guimarães, Kieran Trippier and Dan Burn, with Matt Targett on loan. Across 2022, Newcastle collected 38 points, a total that only three teams in the division bettered.

    They finished 11th. It was survival with a future.

    The door closes

    Then reality arrived, and it arrived quickly.

    Money was the new owners’ obvious advantage. The Premier League moved to limit one of the ways it could be used. At an emergency meeting in October 2021, clubs voted for a temporary ban on deals between Newcastle and companies linked to its owners.

    The ban lasted two months. On 14 December, it was replaced by a permanent rule.

    The rule has an acronym: APT, for associated party transactions. These are commercial deals between a club and companies connected to its owners. Under the new regime, they must reflect fair market value (FMV), meaning the price an unconnected sponsor would pay. The league checks each deal against a database of comparable contracts and can call in independent assessors. Sponsorship deals above £1m had to be submitted for review, going back to 2016.

    The fear behind the rule was simple. A club owned by a state-backed fund could sign sponsors from the same state at prices the open market would never pay. That income would lift revenue, and revenue sets how much a club can spend.

    Newcastle and Manchester City were understood to be the only two clubs that voted against.

    The pivot

    Nobody outside the boardroom can say what the owners expected. But it is reasonable to suspect this was not the plan. A project built on fast, owner-funded growth had run into a rulebook rewritten in direct response to it.

    The first bill arrived in the accounts. Newcastle lost roughly £73m in each of 2022 and 2023.

    The Premier League’s Profit and Sustainability Rules (PSR) cap a club’s permitted losses at £105m over three seasons, before allowable adjustments. By January 2024, the club was acknowledging that it might have to sell one of its best players to stay compliant.

    That left two choices: argue with the rulebook, or build inside it.

    Newcastle built. The pivot had three parts. (1) Grow revenue in ways that would survive scrutiny. (2) Trade players deliberately. (3) And lean on the owners for patient capital rather than unlimited spending.

    Growing inside the lines

    Fair market value made the commercial department one of the most closely watched parts of the club.

    In June 2023, Newcastle announced a multi-year front-of-shirt deal with Sela, a Saudi events company backed by PIF, reported at about £25m a year. The club’s chief executive, Darren Eales, said it followed a highly competitive commercial process. As a PIF-linked company, Sela’s deal had to be deemed fair market value.

    The results show how much of the work happened elsewhere.

    In 2023-24, commercial income rose 90%, from £43.9m to £83.6m. New partners included Adidas, Fenwick and the Saudi companies Sela and Noon, and an Amazon Prime documentary helped. Matchday income rose 32% to £50.1m, with three Champions League nights at St James’ Park. The competition added nearly £30m in distributions.

    Even in 2024-25, with no European football, commercial income rose another 44%, helped by a new in-house retail operation and the St James’ STACK fan zone.

    Turnover tells the story at a glance. It was about £140m in 2021. It reached £180m in 2022, £250.3m in 2023 and £320.3m in 2024. In the year to June 2025, it edged up to a record £335.3m.

    Newcastle United’s turnover since the takeover. FY26 is an independent estimate. Sources: club accounts and announcements; Matchday Finance.

    Losses fell with it, to £11.1m in 2024. The 2025 accounts show a profit after tax of £34.7m.

    The footnotes add detail. That profit includes a £133.2m gain on selling the leasehold improvements at St James’ Park, and a project company, to PZ Holdings, another subsidiary of the club’s parent group. In plain terms, one part of the group sold an asset to another. The league tested it under the same FMV process, and the club says that process has concluded.

    It is disclosed, audited and tested. It also means two numbers sit side by side: a £34.7m headline profit, and an operating loss that PSRwatch puts at roughly £109m.

    Player trading became part of the model. Allan Saint-Maximin and Chris Wood were sold in 2023-24 for £23m and £15m. The owners kept their side of the bargain too. In September 2025, the parent group put in £106.5m of fresh equity. In July 2025, the club refinanced with a £50m term loan and a £50m revolving credit facility, a flexible borrowing line. Both run to July 2028 and are secured on Premier League central funds and ticket revenues.

    The going-concern note in the same accounts is the most revealing line. Auditors need a reason to believe a company can keep trading for twelve months. Here, it is a letter from the parent company saying its present policy will see the club receive the funds it needs through June 2027. The letter describes a policy, not a promise.

    That is not a warning. It is patient capital, described precisely.

    What it bought

    Everything above was a means. Here is the end.

    Hard to beat

    The first Champions League place came from the back.

    In 2021-22, Newcastle conceded 62 goals. In 2022-23, they conceded 33, level with Manchester City for the fewest in the league. They lost five games, again level with City.

    The recruitment behind it was precise. Nick Pope arrived from relegated Burnley for £10m and kept 14 clean sheets in his first season. Sven Botman cost £35m, and Newcastle beat AC Milan to him. Trippier and Burn gave Howe experience and an edge. Alexander Isak, signed for a club-record £63m, supplied the goals.

    Fourth place came with 19 wins, 14 draws and five defeats, and a positive goal difference for the first time since 2011-12. There was a 6–1 against Tottenham in April. A goalless draw with Leicester in the last home game sealed the return to Europe’s top table after two decades.

    The cost came the next year. In 2023-24, Newcastle beat Paris Saint-Germain 4–1 at St James’ Park, but won only one of their six group games and finished seventh. Managing Europe and the league together proved harder than reaching Europe.

    Value for money

    The more telling number is the wage bill.

    Newcastle’s 2024-25 wage bill was £243.5m, the eighth highest in England, according to The Athletic’s reading of the accounts. By that measure, they finished above their wage ranking in each of Howe’s three full seasons.

    Isak is the clearest case. Signed for £63m, he scored in the cup final. In September 2025, he left for Liverpool for a British record £125m, and one independent estimate puts the accounting profit at around £83m.

    A club under PSR cannot spend its way out of mistakes. It has to buy right the first time. The numbers suggest it did, more often than not.

    Wembley

    Then, on 16 March 2025, the wait ended.

    Over 32,000 Geordies made the trip to Wembley. Newcastle’s road had gone through Chelsea at St James’ Park, and a 3–1 quarter-final in which Sandro Tonali scored twice.

    Just before half-time, Burn, a boyhood Newcastle supporter, rose to meet a corner and headed the opener. Isak scored early in the second half. Federico Chiesa pulled one back for Liverpool deep into stoppage time, but there was too little time left.

    Bruno Guimarães and Trippier lifted the trophy. It was Newcastle’s first domestic trophy since the 1955 FA Cup, a gap of 70 years.

    Howe said afterwards that he was emotional, and that the players had been desperate to end the years of hurt.

    Fifth, on goal difference

    The league season closed on a narrower margin.

    Despite a slip at home to Everton on the final day, Newcastle finished fifth with 66 points, level with Aston Villa and ahead on goal difference. That put them back in the Champions League for 2025-26.

    So why did it work twice?

    Three things stand out. First, a head coach given time to build a settled identity. Second, recruitment aimed at fit and value rather than headlines. Third, a commercial and financial machine that kept the money coming without testing the rulebook’s patience.

    None of it was quick. All of it was inside the lines.

    The other road

    A Gulf-backed club took a different road.

    City’s rise began with Sheikh Mansour’s Abu Dhabi takeover in 2008. Between 2009 and 2018, they won the Premier League three times, plus one FA Cup and three League Cups. It is the same period a Premier League commission has just examined.

    On Tuesday 29 September, the league published its findings. The commission found City guilty of all charges relating to serious breaches of the financial rules over nine seasons, and most of the charges relating to failing to co-operate with the investigation. Reports put the total at 114 of the 115 charges. The league’s chief executive, Richard Masters, said the club had systematically broken the rules for nearly a decade.

    City says it is innocent and lodged an appeal on 1 October. The hearing is due by Christmas Eve, and sanctions will be decided separately, with options ranging from a reprimand to expulsion. Nothing is final.

    The contrast is worth drawing carefully.

    Start with the revenue lines. For the first three years after each takeover, the two clubs grew at almost the same pace: City’s revenue was up 76% on Year 1 by Year 3, Newcastle’s 78%. Then City’s revenue jumped 51% in a single year, while Newcastle’s, in a season without European football, rose 5%.

    Year-on-year revenue growth after each takeover. Year 1 is the first financial year containing the takeover. Sources: club accounts, Swiss Ramble, Deloitte; Newcastle Year 5 is an estimate.

    Newcastle’s first trophy took three years and five months. They reached it under rules built in response to their own arrival, so the patience was partly imposed. City challenged those same rules in a legal fight, then settled in September 2025, accepting them as valid and binding.

    Newcastle’s route was slower, and visible in the books. Every deal passed through a test the club did not choose. The verdict against City is not a finding about Newcastle, and the ownership question, with a state fund at the top, is not settled by one case. Masters told MPs in 2023 that he could not say whether the league was re-examining its assurances.

    But the difference is clear enough. One club’s story is now in the hands of an appeal board. The other is still being written in the accounts.

    Year six

    Newcastle return from the international break on 12 October under a new head coach. Matthias Jaissle told supporters in a Q&A on 3 October that his staff joined late in the summer window, with little time to work with the squad.

    The build continues. The 2025 accounts describe the group as exploring an expansion of St James’ Park or a new stadium. From the start, the training-ground plan was an upgrade to Benton first and a new site later, and the 2025 accounts say work continues on the way forward.

    On the first day, the co-owner asked for patience. The surprise is not that the club had to learn it. It is that, five years on, patience is what has set Newcastle apart.

    What are your best memories of the PIF era? Can bring PIF bring Newcastle to the pinnacle of the Premier League? Join the conversation on X @mytoonarmy #NUFC

  • Borrowed Time: What Newcastle’s Numbers Are Actually Buying Jaissle

    The Math No One Tweets

    A tweet on X, a five-game sample, and the maths behind a start that’s running well ahead of the performances underneath it — time the rebuild shouldn’t waste.

    Twelve of sixteen. That’s how many “big chances” Manchester City’s opponents have missed against them this season — the club sitting top of the Premier League, conceding chances at a rate that would alarm most defensive coordinators, saved from the numbers by finishing so wasteful it borders on charitable. It’s a useful place to start, because the exact same mechanism is sitting underneath the numbers at Newcastle right now — just working in the other direction. That’s not a reason to panic. It’s a reason to be honest about what the next few months are actually buying the club, and what needs to happen while the buying lasts.

    The claim

    On Monday night, Ross (@deeprossed) replied to a thread from the analytics account Statz (@Statz_Ai) that had ranked Premier League sides by big chances conceded across their first five matches. Newcastle didn’t crack the top ten. Ross’s conclusion: the volume of shots Newcastle are conceding doesn’t matter, because the shots aren’t good ones, and a defence facing low-quality efforts is a defence that’s fine.

    It’s a reasonable-sounding instinct — the sort of thing that gets nodded along to by ten thousand people before anyone runs a number on it. It’s also wrong, in a way that’s provable rather than debatable, and it’s worth taking apart properly rather than dismissing with a shrug. Ross clearly cares about the numbers enough to go looking for them, which is more than can be said for most of Twitter. He’s just reached for the wrong one.

    Here’s the leaderboard he was working from:

    Two things jump out immediately, and Statz himself flagged the second one in the very next line of his own thread: Manchester City — top of the league, unbeaten, five straight wins — sit fifth on this list, and twelve of the sixteen big chances they’ve conceded have been missed. That’s a 25 per cent conversion rate against opponents in the highest-quality bracket of shot, roughly half what you’d expect a competent Premier League forward line to manage from situations Opta’s own analysts have judged good enough to be expected to score from. City aren’t controlling that outcome. They’re benefiting from it.

    Which means the stat Ross is leaning on for reassurance is the same stat currently explaining why the best team in the country isn’t getting punished the way its underlying defending suggests it should be. If it can flatter Manchester City by twelve wayward finishes, it can just as easily flatter anyone sitting further down that list — including a side that isn’t on it at all.

    Where “big chance” breaks down

    Start with what the category actually measures. A big chance, in Opta’s framework, is a shot from a position where a player would reasonably be expected to score — broadly, the far right tail of shot quality, roughly the efforts carrying something north of a 30–40 per cent chance of going in. It’s a deliberately narrow bucket, built to flag the sitters and the one-on-ones. It was never built to describe the totality of a team’s defensive exposure, and using it that way is the first error in Ross’s reasoning.

    Expected goals exists precisely because a binary “big chance or not” filter throws away almost everything that actually happens in a football match. Every shot faced carries some probability of becoming a goal — a cut-back turned first-time from the edge of the box, a corner that falls kindly for a half-hit volley, a defensive header that only half-clears — and none of those routinely qualify as big chances, while each of them carries a real, non-trivial chance of finding the net. A defence can concede zero big chances by Opta’s definition and still be bleeding an expected-goals total north of two a match, purely by accumulating enough of that middle tier. Counting only the tail and drawing conclusions about the whole distribution is the mistake sitting underneath the tweet.

    The maths nobody tweets

    Treat each shot faced as an independent trial with some probability of success, p, and the probability of conceding at least once across n shots follows: P(at least one goal) = 1 − (1 − p)ⁿ. Shots that fall outside the big-chance bracket still convert at something in the region of one in twelve to one in fourteen — nowhere near zero. Run fifteen of those through the formula at p = 0.07 and the probability of conceding climbs past 65 per cent. Push it to twenty shots and it clears 75 per cent. None of those shots needs to be a big chance for that outcome to arrive. The danger was never sitting in any single effort — it’s compounding across the volume, the same way a casino’s edge does across enough hands, regardless of how unthreatening any individual one looks.

    Goals themselves don’t arrive smoothly, either — they arrive as counts, which is where a Poisson model earns its keep. The tool takes its name from Siméon Denis Poisson, the French mathematician who introduced it in an 1837 study of criminal and civil jury verdicts, working out how to predict the number of rare, independent events that would occur within a fixed stretch — given nothing more than their average rate — from a starting point in probability theory rather than sport. It’s since become the standard way to model exactly that kind of count in football: not how likely any single shot is to score, but how many goals a team is likely to concede across ninety minutes given its overall rate of chances allowed. Treat goals conceded in a match as Poisson-distributed with mean λ equal to cumulative expected goals faced, and the relationship between shot volume and disaster is convex, not linear: nudging λ from 1.0 to 2.0 doesn’t just double the expected goals conceded, it disproportionately inflates the probability sitting in the two-and-three-goal outcomes — the collapses, not the routine defeats.

    And there’s a reason a five-game count of big chances conceded is such an unreliable guide in the first place. Rare-event counts behave like Poisson processes, and their relative variance — the coefficient of variation — scales with 1 ÷ √λ. A stat averaging one or two events a game wobbles enormously over five matches; a stat averaging twelve to fifteen events a game, like total shots faced, doesn’t. Put a number on it: a defence with a genuine long-run rate of 1.5 big chances conceded per game would, over five matches, have a Poisson mean of 7.5 and a standard deviation of roughly 2.7 — meaning a perfectly average defence could produce anywhere from two to thirteen in this exact sample purely by chance, before a single tactical or personnel factor gets involved. The leaderboard Ross quoted, running from 20 down to single figures inside five fixtures, is a metric demonstrating its own unreliability in real time.

    This is also the terrain of PDO — a name that looks like an acronym but isn’t one; it comes from the online handle of a commenter on an old Edmonton Oilers hockey blog who first noticed the pattern it now describes. The stat itself is simple: a team’s save percentage plus its shooting percentage, added together and used as a rough proxy for how much of a team’s results are being carried by finishing variance rather than repeatable process. PDO across a division tends to sit close to a league-average baseline over a full season and drift back toward it wherever it’s strayed. City sitting on a big-chances-conceded record that would normally trouble a mid-table side, while their opponents miss three-quarters of their clearest sights of goal, is a PDO story. Newcastle’s own numbers, below, show exactly where that same dynamic currently sits for them.

    Newcastle, by the numbers

    Here’s where the theory stops being abstract. Through the first four gameweeks of 2026-27 — the last point at which Opta’s underlying data has been fully reconciled into the season totals — Newcastle have created 3.54 expected goals. That’s the second-lowest tally of created chances in the entire Premier League, ahead of only Aston Villa. At the other end, they’ve conceded 7.38 — the second-highest in the division, behind only Crystal Palace. Put those together and the expected-goals difference is −3.84. Not bottom-half. Not relegation-form. The single worst expected-goals difference of any club in the Premier League, marginally worse even than bottom-placed Aston Villa’s −3.73.

    None of that should land as a surprise dressed up as one. This is a squad four months into a genuine rebuild — Bruno Guimarães, Sandro Tonali and Anthony Gordon all sold across the last two windows, a reshaped spine still learning each other, and Matthias Jaissle only a handful of matches into installing a way of playing that was never going to arrive fully formed by September. A dip in the underlying numbers during a squad and identity change is normal. It’s what the numbers below actually mean that matters.

    Run those same four gameweeks through Squawka’s rounded xG model — converting each match’s underlying numbers into the scoreline they actually deserved rather than the one that went on the board — and Newcastle sit 19th, with a record of nought wins, two draws and two defeats. Seven places worse than where they actually stood in the real table at that exact moment. There is no bigger gap between deserved position and actual position anywhere in the division.

    The finishing explains the whole of it. Newcastle have scored seven goals from that 3.54 xG — an overperformance of +3.46, the third-highest in the Premier League, behind only Brighton and Chelsea. It’s carrying the entire points tally. And it’s worth being precise about where the gap actually sits, because the instinctive read — a defence riding its luck — isn’t quite what the numbers show. Newcastle’s expected goals against through four games works out to 1.85 a match. Their actual goals conceded, across five completed fixtures as of 20 September, sit at nine — 1.8 a match. The defence isn’t overperforming its process at all. It’s delivering almost exactly what a genuinely leaky process predicts, goal for goal. The only thing standing between Newcastle and a considerably tougher league table is finishing form at the other end of the pitch, and finishing form is, by some distance, the least repeatable metric in the sport — the first thing to regress once a sample grows.

    One result already hints at what happens when the wrapping comes off. At Elland Road, Newcastle’s underlying play merited something close to a 2-1 defeat — Leeds’ 1.79 xG against Newcastle’s 0.68 rounds cleanly to that scoreline. The actual result was 4-1. The process was already bad enough to lose comfortably on its own merits; on the day, it lost considerably worse than that.

    The very next match, still outside this reconciled four-game window but worth naming on its own terms, put the other half of the argument on the pitch. Hull City had 21 shots at St James’ Park on 19 September — nearly double Newcastle’s own tally of 12, eighteen of them arriving in a second-half siege that had the hosts men behind the ball for long spells. None of that volume amounted to a big chance by Opta’s count; Newcastle actually finished with the better expected-goals total on the day, 1.41 to 1.24, which means Hull’s 21 attempts averaged out to barely a tenth of a goal apiece in quality. Run twenty-one shots at that kind of average probability through the binomial formula above and conceding at least once was odds-on regardless — and Newcastle did, in the 67th minute. What kept the afternoon from unravelling further was two clinical finishes inside the first seven minutes at the other end, and a goalkeeper who made the saves that were there to be made. It’s the whole piece in miniature, inside ninety minutes: a defensive picture that’s genuinely stretched, an attack currently bailing it out, and a final scoreline that gave no hint of either.

    FotMob’s own model, running independently of Opta’s and refreshed through that Hull match, tells much the same story from a different angle: an expected-goals-against total of 9.1 across five games — barely different from the nine goals Newcastle have actually conceded — with only two sides in the entire division rated worse defensively. Different provider, same verdict, one gameweek further on.

    Three clubs, one lesson

    Newcastle aren’t operating in isolation here, and looking at where they sit against two other clubs makes the pattern harder to wave away.

    Manchester City’s process matches their position — elite underlying numbers, elite results, with a layer of finishing luck against them sitting on top of genuine quality rather than substituting for it. Crystal Palace and Aston Villa’s processes also match their positions — poor underlying numbers, poor results, the table doing exactly what you’d expect it to do. Newcastle are the anomaly in this set. Their process is worse than Palace’s. It is marginally worse than Villa’s. And yet they sit fifth in this four-club comparison on points while owning the worst underlying number of the lot — which is exactly why the next block of fixtures matters more than the points column currently suggests, and why the work is worth starting now rather than once the table catches up and says so for them.

    Tyneside has been here before

    None of this is hypothetical for this football club specifically, and it’s worth naming honestly rather than skating past it. In 2011-12, Alan Pardew’s Newcastle finished fifth — an eight-year contract handed out on the strength of it. Buried inside that campaign was a defence recording the worst shots-against totals of Pardew’s tenure, carried by the best save percentage and the kindest finishing luck he ever had at his disposal. None of it repeated. Newcastle spent most of 2012-13 in a real relegation fight, escaping on the second-to-last weekend in 16th.

    The lesson from that season isn’t that the collapse was inevitable — it’s that the window bought by good fortune went unused. Pardew’s Newcastle didn’t reinforce the areas the underlying numbers were flagging; a hot finishing spell got mistaken for the finished article, and the rebuild that should have happened during the grace period simply didn’t. That’s the part worth this side getting right instead, and there’s real reason to think the club is better placed to do it: considerably more resource behind the project than Pardew ever had, a sporting director’s office running recruitment with a plan rather than reacting to results, and a manager who is early enough in his own tenure that these numbers are a diagnosis rather than a verdict. History rhyming isn’t the same as history repeating. What happens next depends on what gets done with the time currently being bought — and that part hasn’t been decided yet.

    The short version

    Facing a lot of shots is dangerous even when hardly any of them are clear-cut, because the risk adds up across the many moderate chances a defence concedes, not just the handful of obvious ones a stats account counts by hand. A ranking built on just five matches of a rare event like “big chances conceded” is too small a sample to trust — it swings wildly by chance alone, which is exactly why Manchester City can sit mid-table on that particular list while topping the real one. Right now, Newcastle’s actual underlying numbers — chances created and chances conceded combined — are the worst in the Premier League, and the only thing keeping the league table from reflecting that is a finishing return in front of goal that ranks among the best in the division — and shooting form is, on the weight of everything football’s underlying numbers show about how it behaves, the least repeatable output in the sport, which makes the current rate far likelier to fall away than to hold.

    None of that is cause for alarm, and it shouldn’t be read as one. It’s a side four months into a genuine rebuild, playing for a manager who is still installing his own way of doing things, currently being carried by a finishing spell that’s buying real, usable time. That’s not a small thing — points banked now are points a harder patch later won’t have to find from scratch. The job in front of Jaissle and his staff is simple to state even if it isn’t easy to do: tighten the process producing the shots faced, keep building the chance creation that’s currently running short, and treat the table’s current generosity as working capital rather than proof the job’s already done. Newcastle have lived a version of this story before, under Pardew in 2011-12, and what went wrong wasn’t the lucky start — it was that the club spent the following year finding that out the hard way instead of getting ahead of it while there was still time. That’s the difference that actually matters here, and unlike the stats above, it’s the one still open to being written the right way.

    What do you think of our start to the season? Will Jaissle be able to tighten things at the back? Join the conversation on X @mytoonarmy #NUFC